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ABSTRACT
Could age be a valid criterion for rationing? In Just health,
Norman Daniels argues that under certain circumstances
age rationing is prudent, and therefore a morally
permissible strategy to tackle the problem of resource
scarcity. Crucial to his argument is the distinction
between two problem-settings of intergenerational equity:
equity among age groups and equity among birth cohorts.
While fairness between age groups can involve unequal
benefit treatment in different life stages, fairness between
birth cohorts implies enjoying approximate equality in
benefit ratios. Although both questions of fairness are
distinct, the resolution of the one depends on resolution of
the other. In this paper, I investigate whether Daniels’
account of age rationing could be defended as a fair way
of setting limits to healthcare entitlements. I will focus on
two main points. First, I will consider whether the age
group problem could be resolved without appealing to a
conception of the good. Second, I will demonstrate that
the connection between the age group problem and the
birth cohort problem runs deeper than Daniels initially
thought—and that it ultimately suggests a method for
prioritisation in problem solving strategies.
Fiscal scarcity in healthcare systems, even in
affluent countries like Switzerland and Germany,
calls for setting limits on healthcare entitlements
as well as establishing priorities among healthcare
services.
i Such scarcity of financial resources is
expected to grow in the face of demographic aging,
and on-going development and implementation of
high-cost medical technology, among other factors.
Some form of rationing, understood as the
distribution of scarce resources within the health-
care system, seems to be unavoidable—and already
takes place in clinical practice.
3 The political
question at stake is not whether heathcare rationing
should be conducted in countries like Switzerland
and Germany, but rather, in which manner should it
be performed.
ii Economic models are certainly
useful in calculating cost-effectiveness, but can
neither set standards for fairness, nor define
general healthcare objectives. In order to uphold
distributive justice in healthcare, a fair scope and
fair criteria of rationing have to be determined by a
political deliberative process. Ethical considerations
of what inclusion and exclusion criteria for
healthcare services are morally permissible have
to play a vital role in this process.
Could age be a valid criterion for rationing? In
chapter 6 of Just health: meeting health needs fairly,
6
Norman Daniels takes up an earlier approach of his
and argues that under certain circumstances, age
rationing is prudent, and therefore a morally
permissible
iii strategy to tackle problems of
resource scarcity. Crucial to his argument is a
distinction between two problem-settings of inter-
generational equity, namely equity among age
groups and equity among birth cohorts. While
fairness between age groups can involve unequal
benefit treatment in different life stages, fairness
between birth cohorts implies enjoying approxi-
mate equality in benefit ratios. Although both
questions of fairness are distinct, the resolution of
the one depends on the resolution of the other. In
this paper I will investigate whether Daniels’
account of age rationing could justify a fair way
of setting limits to healthcare entitlements. I will
focus on two points, one concerning his modified
resolution of the age group problem, and the other
concerning the interconnectedness of the age group
problem and the birth cohort problem.
NORMAN DANIELS: A CASE FOR AGE RATIONING
Daniels carefully avoids fuelling the suspicion that
his account of age rationing amounts to some form
of discrimination, namely ‘‘ageism’’.
8 He acknowl-
edges that societal aging, namely due to declining
fertility rates and longer lifespan, is ‘‘maybe the
most important public health problem of the 21st
century’’ (p162)
6 since it profoundly alters the
population age structure and profile of healthcare
needs. But these empirical changes alone should
not be appealed to as moral reasons to cut
heathcare services for older people, even if they
result in high-costs for the healthcare system.
iv
Justifying age rationing with direct appeal to
demographic aging would require either ignoring
the political and moral ideal of solidarity existing
between adjacent generations as expressed in
universal coverage, or fallaciously concluding some
normative imperative that based on the fact that
the elderly population is growing, their health
needs count less. Daniels is far from adopting such
an argument. Nevertheless, adjustments to health-
care entitlements will have to be made as the
available healthcare budget continues to diminish,
iiiWhat is prudent is also morally permissible for,
7 (p276) although
not necessarily a sufficient reason for an accordant policy.
iAfter the USA, Switzerland has the second- and Germany the third-
most expansive healthcare system worldwide with approximately
11% of gross domestic product spent on healthcare in 2003. Cf
12
iiCf
4 (p21) and the report of the Swiss Academy of Medical
Sciences.
5
ivGeorg Marckmann forcefully argues that there is no direct empirical
link between age and healthcare costs but rather one between
approximation to death and costs. Demographic aging burdens the
healthcare system because the non-working population increases
disproportionately.
2 Various policy remedies could approach this issue,
for instance raising retirement age or incentives for child bearing.
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increasing financial burden of trying to sustain healthcare
services. To make these adjustments—as Daniels previously
asserts in Just health care
9—it is ‘‘prudent’’ to take age into
account. That is, it is a morally permissible strategy to consider
age when distributing resources although there is, of course, no
prior moral obligation to pursue such a strategy.
Daniels contemplates age rationing in the following manner:
first, he rejects the idea of conceptualising different age groups
as competing for healthcare resources. According to him, this
approach is misleading because it ignores the crucial anthro-
pological fact that we all age. Instead, he suggests that we frame
the question about fair distribution of resources between age
groups differently—as a problem of a single individual who
must reason how to prudently allot healthcare resources across
different temporal stages in her life. In other words, Daniels
resolves the issue of interpersonal justice by way of intraperso-
nal reasoning, or intrapersonal transfer of resources and
‘‘savings’’. This ‘‘prudential lifespan account’’ avoids the charge
of ageism by transforming the ‘‘problem between us and them’’
into a ‘‘problem about my own life’’. All people are treated
similarly in a particular stage of life (although birth cohorts
reach such a stage at different times). Thus, the requirement of
justice in the Aristotelian sense, namely to treat like cases alike
and different cases differently, is fulfilled. Or, as Larry Churchill
suggests, ‘‘So what from a slice-of-life perspective seems unfair
appears egalitarian in an over-a-lifetime view’’.
10 v
In fact, the prudential lifespan account does not necessarily
lead to age rationing, at least not directly. The fair share of
healthcare resources available to the prudent planner has to
guarantee a fair share of normal opportunities that she can
reasonably expect given her natural skills and talents, and
societal circumstances. It is then her task to allocate these
resources appropriately, so as to carry out a life plan that falls
within the limits of a normal opportunity range as defined for a
given society. She might come to the conclusion that in light of
the effects of resource scarcity, not all her healthcare needs can
be met throughout her lifespan; it is best for her to budget
resources unequally throughout life in order to make her life ‘‘as
a whole better than alternatives’’ (p174).
6
A decision on how to allocate resources over ones lifespan
that is considered prudent by the individual would similarly be
considered prudent by participants of a fair deliberative process
deciding how to distribute healthcare within a society. Daniels
is confident that these participants—whom he considers to be
‘‘fair-minded people’’—could generalise individual plans and
converge on a common social security scheme. Moreover, their
agreement would also give justificatory ground for what they
agreed upon. If they agreed that unequal provision of healthcare
to the young and old would be beneficial to all of society, then
age rationing would be justified, or so Daniels argues.
It seems evident that the decision to ration based on age is
not determined in advance for every society, since it would
depend on the particular economic and political situation of
that society. Note that Daniels regards age rationing as
essentially a last resort; it is allowed only if a more prudent
alternative is not available. Whether age rationing is a prudent
option, presumably depends on the wealth of a nation and a
lack of rational alternatives. Thus, according to Daniels, pure
age-based rationing can be morally permissible if a society faces
vast resource scarcity.
vi
By employing the prudential lifespan account, Daniels
defends age rationing as a legitimate rationalisation strategy
without making the moral assumption that life at one age is
more valuable than at another. He also avoids appealing to
duties between the old and the young. Under some circum-
stances, members of society would just be better off from an age
rationing scheme, he argues. Nevertheless, he remains silent on
the question of what particular reasons should society give to
justify age as a valid criterion for rationing (in addition to, or
instead of, other criteria). If Daniels’ prudential lifespan account
is in fact a morally permissible, fair and rational way to design a
resource allocation scheme, then why not always adopt it when
rationing is necessary in the healthcare sector? Considering that
even wealthy countries such as Switzerland openly think about
rationing policies, a Danielsian form of age rationing could
become a prevailing strategy that potentially guided policy
decisions.
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE AGE GROUP PROBLEM
According to Daniels, the moral importance of healthcare stems
from the fact that normal species functioning has a significant
effect on the opportunity available to an individual.
Consequently, there is a societal obligation to guarantee
individuals a fair share of the normal opportunity range for
their society, given their talents and skills. Insofar as disease and
disability impair normal functioning—and thus forestall the
enjoyment of a fair share of opportunity range—normal
functioning has to be restored (and protected) through
healthcare provision. This line of thought prompts the question
whether illness related to aging and death would have to be
treated at all. Is not aging, as Daniel Callahan
12 argues, a natural
component of life, and thus belongs to ‘‘normal species typical
functioning’’? In line with Christopher Boorse,
13 Daniels
understands disease not as any unwanted condition, but as a
departure from normal functioning.
vii Therefore, given Daniels’
account, what moral reasons do we have to provide care to a
fragile and demented 80-year-old person in the first place,
especially if her physical and mental condition could be
perceived as resulting from a normal aging process?
Daniels does not explicitly address this question. However, in
Just health and in his earlier work he mentions an ‘‘age-relative
normal opportunity range’’.
7 Presumably such an age-relative
opportunity range is undermined or impaired in the case of the
fragile and demented 80-year-old. If impairment of fair share of
normal opportunities bears moral weight, rather than the (age-
relative or not age-relative) origin of impairment, then the
provision of care to the 80-year-old is not a matter of
compassion or benevolence. It is a matter of justice and fairness
to counteract impairment of opportunity for older people. It is
important to establish this point in order to understand why
Daniels considers the age group problem to be a matter of
fairness, and therefore a part of his theory of healthcare justice.
As previously elaborated, Daniels solves the age group
problem with the help of a rational thought experiment—the
prudential lifespan account. In comparison to his earlier
work,
91 5he modifies this account in a crucial respect. Initially,
vIn critic of Daniels, McKerlie demands that justice has to say something about
synchronic distribution between different ages as well.
11 I agree with McKerlie that if
we are concerned with the real world situation in which healthcare reductions have to
be justified, we do this not to ourselves undergoing a prudential lifespan thought
experiment, but to other affected people.
viCf
6 (p178ff) ‘‘Pure age rationing’’ means providing differential treatment to persons of
different ages not because of different healthcare needs, but simply and only because
they belong to different age groups.
viiOn Daniels’ concept of disease cf also Jecker.
14
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deciding under conditions of ignorance in which the planner is
blinded to facts about her life and her actual preferences. Veiled
prudence would prevent any bias that a ‘‘fully conformed
rational consumer’’ might have when asked to allot resources
over her lifespan (p51).
15 In the style of the Rawlsian ‘‘veil of
ignorance’’, under which parties in the ‘‘original position’’ have
to decide on principles of justice, Daniels’ veiled prudence
consists of four key elements: (1) The prudent planner does not
know her age. (2) The prudent planner is ignorant of her
conception of the good, although she knows that she might
want to alter her conception of the good in the course of her life.
Therefore she has an interest in keeping her options open for
future revisions. (3) The prudent planner is guided by a time-
neutral concern for her wellbeing over the lifespan. (4) The
prudent planner has to plan for each stage of her life under the
assumption that she will live through it.
These four conditions for prudential planning remerge in
chapter 6 of Just health. But, compared to what he thought in
earlier works, Daniels is more sceptical of whether veiled
prudence is enough to guide justice.
7 In Just health he explicitly
states: ‘‘I also underestimated the sources of disagreement about
how to set priorities in meeting needs at different stages of a life
by relying on prudence alone. […] we must supplement the [fair
equality of (SB)] opportunity principle—even relativised to a
stage of life—with fair [deliberative (SB)] process’’ (p175).
6
Daniels seems to express the concern that reasonable disagree-
ment between ‘‘fair minded people’’ could emerge in the
context of making specific trade-offs when deciding on an
age-relative healthcare scheme. Since such disagreement is
reasonable, prudence alone cannot lead to a resolution. It has
to be accompanied by a ‘‘fair deliberative process’’, explicated by
Daniels as ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ (chapter 4).
6
This alteration of Daniels’ earlier approach is not unexpected.
Already in Am I my parents’ keeper? Daniels acknowledges that
there is no one prudent plan for all individuals (p54),
15 despite
thinking that the lack of information would be sufficient to
eliminate differences. However, the planners would have to be
informed of societal circumstances in order to decide on a
transfer scheme. Such information, including information about
demographic aging and evolving patterns of needs could be
evaluated differently, depending on an individual’s sensitivity to
risk or an individual’s cherishing of the option to revise her
conception of the good. There are good reasons to reserve a
majority of healthcare resources for the early and middle age
during which individuals receive education, work and raise
children, and so on. But there are also good reasons to reserve a
lot of resources for old age; first, there is less a risk of becoming
sick as a young person, and second, due to higher life
expectancy, individuals tend to live a lengthy portion of their
life in retirement and thus under a restricted financial budget.
Achieving an agreement on such reasonable disagreement
would, to my mind, signify leaving the dimension of impartial
prudence and entering that of policy affairs. This contradicts
Daniels’ earlier statement that he intends to reserve the former
dimension for the age group problem, and the latter for the birth
cohort problem.
7 This friction in Daniels’ account does not
necessarily present a severe problem to his latest theory of
justice in healthcare,
6 the heart of which is ‘‘accountability for
reasonableness’’. Pluralism of reasonable views could well be
facilitated in a fair procedural manner of policymaking—and
besides arriving to a modus vivendi, a more in depth reasonable
agreement might not be required for Daniels.
There is, however, another discrepancy in Daniels’ account
that might pose a more serious problem to his approach. In Just
health, he still appeals to the prudential lifespan account as a
way of generating good reasons for age-relative resource
allocation. Prudent trade-offs are guided—and justified as
fair—when they ‘‘make life as a whole better than alternatives’’
(p174).
6 Yet, there is likely to be disagreement about what
distribution makes life as a whole better. Imagine a person who
strongly believes in reincarnation and thus regards her life only
as an episode in a series of life forms. Death might not frighten
her as much as it does for other people. Her prime goal might be
to achieve a higher quality of life, not necessarily to live as many
years of her ‘‘current life’’ as possible. She might be ready to
trade away total quality of life years in order to have more
healthcare resources available in earlier life stages
viii; moreover,
she might be willing to risk dying in later life stages because she
previously used up resources. For another person, such risk-
taking behaviour might be absolutely intolerable. His chief value
might be quantity of life years, regardless of the level of quality
of life that can be expected. Believing that his life is in the hands
of God, it would be morally wrong for him to intentionally risk
shortening his lifespan. He might decide to allocate healthcare
resources more equally over the course of his life in an attempt
to live as long as possible.
These examples highlight the important point that deciding
how to budget resources over a lifespan most likely depends on
the individual’s conception of a good life, and thus varies
according to cultural, historical, religious, political and biogra-
phical background. Daniels tries to circumvent this dependency
by designing prudent planners who are ignorant of their own
conception of the good. However, such blindness cannot be
comprehensive because in a deliberative process, prudent
planners still have to be able to decide on ‘‘what makes life as
a whole better’’. Even if they were ignorant of their own
particular conception of the good, and were just informed about
the types of conceptions they could adopt in their society, there
still could be disagreement about which conception of the good
should be appealed to in deciding ‘‘what makes life as a whole
better’’. Despite Daniels’ intention to design the prudential
lifespan account in a purely procedural manner, it might not be
a workable account without further work done fleshing out
‘‘what makes life as a whole better than alternatives’’.
INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF BIRTH COHORT PROBLEM AND AGE
GROUP PROBLEM
Daniels explicitly states that a solution to the age group
problem must be compatible with a solution to the birth cohort
problem and vice versa, despite both problems being distinct. In
the following discussion, I will argue that the interconnected-
ness of the two problems runs deeper than Daniels initially
thought. Contrary to Daniels’ argument,
7 a ranking of the two
types of problems is necessary for reasons of theoretical
coherency. Additionally, it is necessary in the face of rapid
societal aging and start-up problems of developing countries.
In his earlier work, Daniels carefully asserts that the age
group problem has to be ‘‘framed’’ by the ‘‘fair equality of
opportunity principle’’ (p47).
15 7 That is, the opportunity
principle does not guide prudent allocation of healthcare
resources over the lifespan directly; rather, it defines the
conditions under which prudent allocation takes place (p178).
6
7 In a pointed remark, Daniels explains the meaning of framing:
viiiDaniels mentions the possibility of trading away total quality of life years as well
(p175 footnote 9).
6
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prudent deliberators must allocate over the lifespan. […] Put
more simply, for prudent budgeting, a budget is needed, but
what the budget is must depend on what is just, on what people
are entitled to’’ (pp53, 63).
15 Daniels makes the assumption that
there are limits to fairness (defined by the ‘‘fair equality of
opportunity principle’’), which determine the budget for
healthcare services. These limits are not at the disposal of
prudent planners. Instead, prudent planners must decide on
how to allocate healthcare resources over the lifespan within
these limits. The task of defining the budget for prudent
planners is part of the solution to the birth cohort problem.
Consequently, Daniels’ claim that framing the issue of prudent
allocation over the lifespan by principles of fairness already
suggests that solving the birth cohort problem is prior to solving
the age group problem—prudent planners cannot budget if they
do not have a defined budget available.
A closer look at Daniels’ solution of the birth cohort problem
is necessary to understand his explanation for why cohorts
should have an interest in fair cooperation and budget
distribution among each other. His argument for the motivation
to cooperate is built on the assumption that there are two
common interests among cohorts: all aspire to solve the age
group problem effectively through stable institutions, and all
aim to share risks across cohorts. Accordingly, cooperation
becomes a matter of prudence. If cohorts cooperate, then they
can circumvent uncertainty about population, economic
growth rates, and technological change, which subsequently
may affect productivity (p182f).
6 The willingness to share risks
is a crucial factor in sustaining the stability of institutions.
Conversely, expected stability builds trust in institutions and
motivates cohorts to share risk since intercohort transfer
schemes are considered to be fair over time. However, what is
the consequence of a diminishing common interest in risk
sharing? On Daniels’ account, erosion of intercohort solidarity
would ultimately result in a loss of the incentive for solving
intergenerational problems together. Daniels repeatedly states
that the prudential lifespan account, which allows unequal
resource distribution over the lifespan under fairness considera-
tions, could only succeed if institutions are trusted as being
stable and fair over time (p51)
15 (pp181–5).
6 Otherwise, the
claim that we all age equally in respect to uneven healthcare
entitlements granted at different life stages, would no longer be
valid. The preconditions of stability and fairness of transfer
schemes could be regarded as theoretical constraints within an
‘‘ideal theory’’ in which choosers behind the ‘‘veil of ignorance’’
can expect earlier benefits to continue throughout their
lifetime.
16 However, Francis remains sceptical of the capacity
of an ideal theory to solve real world problems, arguing, ‘‘It is
quite different to bring age rationing into play in a world of
people who have already suffered from injustice, than to
consider it for people who will live their full lives in a just
society’’.
16 Francis is right to point to the complexity of real
world problems that might undermine theoretical constraints.
Although, an ideal theory still has the important function of
channelling ideas and thoughts about issues of social justice.
Consider the following argument:
If a cohort knows with certainty that the economical,
political, social, or demographical situation of a past or future
cohort is considerably worse, then ‘‘sharing risk’’ would take
place in a knowingly lopsided manner. When grievances are
expected, it is safe to assume that motivation to cooperate with
affected cohorts may diminish. That is, the willingness to
cooperate might only be guaranteed so long as all cohorts
operate under uncertainty. However, in the case of vast societal
aging, there is certainty of potential grievances. Daniels admits
that the ‘‘problem goes beyond uncertainty and errors for we
are certain about the strains that rapid societal aging will place
on existing transfer schemes in developed countries and the
obstacle that aging imposes on establishing new schemes in
many developing countries’’ (p182).
6 Diminishing labour forces
and evolving patterns of needs confer high costs on the
remaining working population without assuring them that
the same standard of healthcare will be received when they
age.
ix Under the Danielsian framework, budgets of adjacent
cohorts would be of different amplitude. Such differences pose
an obstacle to finding a fair solution to the age group problem
through prudential lifespan allocation. Adjacent birth cohorts
would not age equally due to serious budget variations; thus,
the initial rationale that ‘‘we all age’’ would loose its persuasive
power for the employment of the prudential lifespan account.
The situation in developing countries offers another concrete
example of trust being absent in institutions. Recall that
Daniels explicitly allows for pure age rationing under conditions
of vast resource scarcity; however, his argument is not cogent
when taking into account the vastly different circumstances of
aging in developing countries compared to industrialised
countries. Developing countries are confronted with extreme
poverty, lack of healthcare services, enormous burdens of
disease, unjust political institutions, and the likelihood of war.
Due to devastating political and economical circumstances, the
elderly would have fewer ‘‘opportunities’’ than were available in
the past. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that the
elderly would agree—or think it is prudent—to allot more
resources to the young than to themselves. This objection,
initially raised by Engelman and Johnson,
17 could be refuted by
Daniels in a twofold manner. First, the ‘‘fair equality of
opportunity principle’’ should not apply directly to age-relative
resource allocation. Second, in the prudential lifespan account,
prudent planners do not know whether they belong to the old
generation or to the young generation. Nevertheless, the
problem remains that trust in institutions must first be
established before making the prudential lifespan account work.
Therefore, solving the problem of equity among birth cohorts
should be given priority. Only under the condition of
approximate equality in benefit rations could the prudential
lifespan account be used to solve the age group problem, thereby
justifying age rationing as a fair way of setting limits to
healthcare entitlements.
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